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HOW THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES MIGHT 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE THEOLOGICAL 
DEBATE ABOUT FREE WILL
AKU VISALA
Abstract
This article argues that recent results of the cognitive sciences could make significant contributions to 
theological debates about free will, but they have been largely ignored by contemporary systematic and 
philosophical theologians. Recent work in cognitive psychology and moral psychology has to do with our 
intuitive and automatic patterns of reasoning in the domains of freedom and responsibility. This research 
will be relevant for many theological domains and has the potential to raise new issues and problems. The 
essay examines three such domains. First, the debate between intellectualist and voluntarist accounts of the 
will have been central in theology. Recent findings suggest that intellectualist accounts of the will have more 
intuitions on their side than has been previously assumed. Second, theologians have debated whether belief 
in free will is central for moral and political life. This question was pertinent during the Reformation when 
many of the reformers either rejected free will or presented truncated accounts of it. Recent results from moral 
psychology suggest that belief in free will has significant pro- social and altruistic effects. Finally, the possible 
compatibility of divine determinism and free will is crucial for theological debates about sin, grace and God’s 
providence. Recent psychological results point in the direction of affirming that while most humans have 
strong intuitions about the incompatibility of free will and divine determinism, these might be based on a 
false inference. Finally, some new counterintuitive challenges about the manipulativeness of God are raised 
against the divine determinist position.
Introduction
Free will is a perennial theological topic. It is of crucial importance for Christian theol-
ogy, since it cuts through almost all traditional dogmatic loci, spanning from the doc-
trine of God (God’s will) to sin, grace and theological anthropology in general. The 
topic is difficult and divisive: free will has been among the most central issues dividing 
theological traditions and denominations. One only needs to look at the Reformation as 
an example. Today, these issues are extensively discussed in analytic philosophical the-
ology. This is partly because free will is a cottage industry in English- speaking analytic 
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philosophy. In the interest of making my own standing explicit, I should say that I oper-
ate in this context as well, so I will find most of my discussion partners there.
What I seek to do in this article is to demonstrate how recent work in the cognitive 
sciences— broadly construed— might enrich the theological debate about free will and 
even make a significant contribution to it.1 First, I will discuss the definition of free will 
and how recent studies might contribute to the theological discussion on the conditions 
of free will. Second, I will outline some results about the significance of free will. Finally, 
I will examine how the results of the cognitive sciences might be relevant to the debate 
between theological compatibilists and incompatibilists.
The Cognitive Sciences and Free Will Skepticism
To begin, we should distinguish four questions about free will.2 First, we ask for the 
definition of free will or the conditions required for it. What is it and what is it about? 
Second, we ask why free will matters at all. If it has very little significance for us and our 
lives, why bother debating the issue? The third question is the most classical one— the 
compatibility of free will and various forms of determinism. Many have found it ini-
tially plausible to think that if determinism were true, humans could not have free will. 
Finally, there is the question of whether human agents ultimately have free will. I am 
convinced that the cognitive sciences are relevant for answering all these questions.
Let us begin, rather backwardly, from the last question. Most Christian theologians 
affirm that humans are morally responsible and have free will, at least in some sense. Of 
course, there is significant disagreement over the conditions of free will and whether it 
is compatible with determinism. Nevertheless, theologians have been reluctant to reject 
free will wholesale. Against this, most contemporary skeptical arguments against free 
will invoke some results of the cognitive sciences and neuroscience. Although things 
have changed in the last decade or so, results of the cognitive sciences have often been 
taken to support some form of free will skepticism or another.
The skeptical threat can be formulated as follows. As we will soon see, a crucial condi-
tion of free will is the existence of some mental states associated with the agent that play 
an explanatory role of some kind in making sense of the agent’s actions. In other words, 
the intentions, beliefs and goals of the agent make a difference with respect to the actions 
of the agent. However, a number of neuroscientists and cognitive scientists have pre-
sented results suggesting that the connection between our consciously accessible men-
tal states and our actions is much looser than we ordinarily assume. Indeed, some have 
maintained that our consciously accessible mental states make no difference whatsoever 
in terms of our actions. If our mental states would turn out to be epiphenomenal with re-
spect to our actions in this sense, it would be difficult to see how we could have free will.
Some skeptical arguments have their roots in the neurosciences. Most famously, neu-
roscientist Benjamin Libet conducted a series of experiments about how conscious 
1 I construe the cognitive sciences very broadly here. They are an umbrella for various approaches, theo-
ries and research programs that seek to study how information- processing systems work. As such, the cogni-
tive sciences involve neurosciences, cognitive psychology, computer science and evolutionary psychology. 
For an introduction, see, e.g., Keith Frankish and William Ramsey, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
2 Michael McKenna and Derk Pereboom, Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 
2016), 4.
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decisions are temporally related to measurable brain events. Without going into the 
details, Libet- style experiments involve the measuring of brain activity in some way 
(EEG, fMRI) and its timing in relation to the conscious decision to act. The act measured 
in the experiments is usually something like basic motor movement, like flexing of 
one’s hand, such as in the original Libet experiment.3 The surprising finding in the orig-
inal study was that there is an activation of the motor cortex 400 milliseconds before the 
subject became aware of her conscious decision to act. One skeptical interpretation of 
these results (and more contemporary ones) is that the conscious decision to act is not 
the cause of the action, but rather an effect of the triggering of the motor neurons, which 
takes place prior to consciousness.
Neuroscience is not the only source of skeptical arguments. A number of psychol-
ogists and cognitive scientists have pointed out that there is substantive evidence for 
thoroughgoing automatism in human action and cognition. Not only does conscious-
ness not have access to many action- generating cognitive mechanisms, but conscious 
explanations of action are often post- hoc rationalizations. Instead of being under direct 
conscious control, our actions are in fact products of cognitive mechanisms that take 
very little input from conscious processing.
Psychologist Daniel Wegner summarizes this work and argues that our conscious 
feeling of being the sources of our actions might be mistaken. A number of experiments 
show that our source experience can be manipulated. We can act voluntarily without 
having conscious experience of doing so and the experience of acting can be induced in 
us, while we are in fact acting involuntarily. This means that the source experience is not 
a direct apprehension of the agent being the source of her action but rather an uncon-
scious inference. Invoking both cognitive psychology and neuroscience studies, Wegner 
argues that these inferences are mostly mistaken. Our unconscious cognitive mecha-
nisms are not only the sources of our actions, but also the source of the conscious feeling 
of acting.4
These skeptical challenges have sparked an extensive scientific and philosophical de-
bate that is still ongoing. While the issue of free will skepticism is highly relevant for 
theologians, it will not be the main focus in this article. The reason is that there is much 
high- quality “apologetic” work responding to the skeptical challenge already available 
and it seldom tackles the specific questions theologians are interested in. In addition, I 
am personally convinced that the skeptical challenge is mostly a failure. Here are some 
reasons why I think this is the case.
First, as philosopher Neil Levy points out, neuroscientific experiments measure the 
timing of the conscious decision to act. When such a decision is not found prior to some 
brain event, the skeptic concludes that there are no actions that are consciously initi-
ated. However, there is no reason to think that a conscious decision immediately prior 
to action is really needed for free will after all.5 Indeed, many of our stereotypically free 
actions are such that a direct, conscious decision to act or initiate the action is missing. 
Instead, it is enough that our actions are products of intentions and beliefs that can be 
consciously accessed or controlled at some point in time or other. In this sense, Libet- 
style experiments fail to show that conscious mental states are disconnected from 
actions.
3 For classical experiments, see, e.g., Benjamin Libet, “Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of 
Conscious Will in Voluntary Action,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1985): 529- 66.
4 Daniel Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002).
5 Neil Levy, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 24.
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Second, in his extensive critical analysis of Libet- style experiments, philosopher 
Alfred Mele points out that in Libet- style experiments the actions of the subjects are 
rather simple motor behaviors, like flexing one’s hand. Such behaviors are a far cry 
from complex moral and deliberated decisions. So, even if it turns out that conscious-
ness lags behind simple motor behavior, this says nothing about consciousness being 
bypassed in those complex decisions that are stereotypically associated with free will.6 
To support this point, there is some evidence suggesting that the readiness potential of 
the motor cortex tracked in Libet- style experiments is not even triggered in the context 
of complex, deliberated decisions. So, it seems that conscious deliberation activates a 
different set of brain mechanisms than arbitrary, simple motor behavior.7
Regarding the automaticity challenge of Wegner and others, both Levy and Mele in-
voke a number of results suggesting that conscious intentions and decisions make a 
significant impact on human behavior. Consciousness in general plays a significant role 
in planning future actions and in producing flexible and responsive action. In addition, 
consciousness is implicated in many cases of moral decision- making.8 Moreover, Levy 
points out that while automaticity is indeed a thoroughgoing feature of our cognition, 
this does not mean that automatic cognitive functioning is “dumb.” As we will soon 
see, some accounts of free will require that free actions be rational. Such rationality is 
possible even in situations where consciousness has very little to do with the initiation 
of actions. Mele adds to this by pointing out that there is significant evidence for the 
efficacy of conscious decisions. In a meta- analysis of almost a hundred studies, psychol-
ogist Peter Gollwitzer and others found that when subjects committed themselves to 
various future actions, their behaviors tended to differ from those who did not make the 
same kind of commitment.9 What people decide to do clearly matters for their 
actions.10
Even if we conclude that the aforementioned skeptical challenge fails, there is something 
important it can teach theologians about how free will works. It turns out that many of our 
decisions, choices and actions are driven by causes that are ultimately beyond our direct 
control and causes we have trouble identifying introspectively. The role of consciousness 
is more of a supervisor overseeing the work of many different subordinates than that of a 
king who directly dictates actions. These conclusions support those theological accounts 
of sin which suggest that there are certain aspects of our moral character that are difficult 
or impossible for us to control. Our deep motivations and moral goals might be fixed by 
factors beyond our control to such an extent that some acts of God would be necessary in 
order to change them. As we will soon see, this is just one possible way in which theolo-
gians working within the Augustinian tradition might find the sciences supporting their 
view.
6 Alfred Mele, Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
7 See, e.g., Uri Maoz et al. “Neural Precursors of Decisions that Matter– an ERP Study of Deliberate and 
Arbitrary Choice,” eLife (2019) https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.39787
8 Levy, Consciousness, 77- 79.
9 Mele, Effective Intentions, 135- 36.
10 For discussion, see Susan Pockett, William Banks, and Shaun Gallagher, eds., Does Consciousness Cause 
Behavior? (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006); John Baer, James Kaufman, and Roy Baumeister, eds., Are 
We Free? Psychology and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein, and 
Tillman Vierkant, eds., Decomposing the Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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What Is Free Will?
In addition to providing evidence for or against the existence or non- existence of free 
will, the cognitive sciences can be relevant for theology in other ways, namely, they can 
tell us how people actually reason about free will, moral responsibility and related no-
tions. Researchers are tracking and identifying inference patterns and information pro-
cessing tendencies that normally operate outside conscious awareness. In the jargon of 
the field, these are referred to as “intuitions,” “intuitive inferences” or “folk theories.” 
The results are relevant, because theologians and philosophers sometimes invoke eve-
ryday intuitions in support of their arguments. It is often assumed, for instance, that 
most people would intuitively reject the compatibility of free will and determinism. 
Should we not test such assumptions?11
For now, let us focus on those intuitions and folk theories regarding the nature of the will 
in general and free will in particular. It is not at all clear what the phenomenon of free will 
actually is, or if there even is such a thing. There are a number of different starting points in 
current philosophical literature. First, many take the phenomenon of free will as essentially 
linked to moral responsibility.12 More specifically, an action of an agent must be freely per-
formed if the agent is justifiably to be held morally responsible for it. In other words, free 
will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Usually, moral responsibility requires 
another condition to be met as well, namely, an epistemic condition: the agent must have ac-
cess to relevant knowledge. Free will is the other condition, sometimes called control condi-
tion. So, free will is an ability or power of persons to have control over their actions in a way 
that allows for the attribution of moral responsibility.13 It is easy to see how these conditions 
work in practice: we are held responsible for actions that we have done voluntarily and 
knowingly.
Peter van Inwagen, for instance, has argued that the question of free will is a question 
about whether making choices is compatible with possibly true, metaphysical features of 
our world (like determinism).14 It is typical for humans to think that when we make a 
choice, there are alternative futures open to us. The future is like a garden of forking paths 
unfolding in front of us and our choices determine which of these forking paths become 
actual.15 Van Inwagen is surely right in the sense that this garden of forking paths picture 
often drives the debates about free will in many contexts. If it turned out that this picture 
was false and we had no access to alternative courses of actions, moral responsibility would 
be difficult to conceive. If I have no choice, I cannot be blamed, or so it seems.
The phenomenon of free will has to with the fact that some actions (and decisions and 
intentions) seem to be “up to us” and others do not. Without this up- to- usness it is diffi-
cult to see how humans could be morally responsible for their actions. Now, we should 
ask what this up- to- usness actually requires, that is, under what conditions our actions 
are up to us. According to the most minimalist and modest view, up- to- usness consists 
of an agent acting according to her intentions and beliefs without external or internal 
compulsion. The agent is in control of her actions, when those actions are voluntary 
11 There are reasons to tread carefully here. By providing evidence that one view is more intuitive than 
another, one has not given reasons to think the former view is true and the latter is false. Many intuitive infer-
ences turn out to be false.
12 See e.g., Kevin Timpe, Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, second edition (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013).
13 McKenna and Pereboom, Free Will, 6.
14 Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 8.
15 Peter van Inwagen, Metaphysics, third edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2009), 253- 54.
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(intended by her) and not products of outside influence. Some philosophers add to this 
and maintain that an agent must have the capacity to evaluate and be conscious of her 
reasons for actions. Let us call this free will light. Many who defend the compatibility of 
determinism and free will gravitate towards this way of understanding free will.
Some take a stronger view: in addition to free will light, an agent must be capable of 
choices that are in some way or another underdetermined, such that the agent has alter-
native possibilities available to her at the moment of decision or sometime before that. 
According to this free will regular position, the world needs to be such that our brains, 
histories and perhaps even the micro- physical structure of the world work in an inde-
terministic fashion. Without this indeterminism, there would be no choice that is truly 
up to us to make. Finally, there is the free will premium view. Here, even deep openness 
is not enough: in order to exert control over an action, the agent herself must be the ul-
timate source of “the springs of her action.” An agent’s actions have their source in her 
intentions, goals and tendencies rooted in her character. In order to be truly free, an 
agent must, therefore, be responsible for these as well; an agent should be the creator 
and sustainer of her own goals. Traditionally, theologians have argued that human 
agents are non- physical souls: because they stand outside the natural world, they are 
not subject to prior causes, like bodies and brains, thus guaranteeing this kind of ulti-
mate responsibility.16
All three views seek to capture the everyday up- to- us conditions of free will. We 
could now ask what the everyday view actually is. The research is still ongoing and 
there is no overall consensus on the matter. However, some interesting results have al-
ready emerged. In a recent article reviewing experimental results, Andrew Monroe and 
Bertram Malle draw a conclusion that goes against the grain of much philosophical and 
theological reflection. As I already mentioned, sometimes free will is associated with a 
metaphysical view of the self as a soul. However, there is some evidence suggesting that 
everyday intuitions about free will go in another direction. According to Monroe and 
Malle, two- thirds of the subjects associated free will with making choices and decisions; 
the other two phenomena mentioned were “doing what one wants” and “acting with-
out constraints.” No clear correlation between belief in souls or metaphysical selves and 
belief in free will emerged in their studies. Monroe and Malle conclude that
These preliminary data cast doubt on the characterization of people’s concept of 
free will as magical and metaphysical. Instead they suggest that the ordinary un-
derstanding of free will is rooted in the folk concept of intentionality (especially the 
components of desire and choice) and extends beyond it by also considering inter-
nal and external constraints on behavior.17
If this is correct, it points away from the free will premium position— especially if we 
take it to be entailing a commitment to mind/body dualism. Monroe and Malle also sug-
gest that “people don’t seem to demand that the agent could have (in an otherwise parallel 
reality) acted differently; what matters is that in this reality the agent made a choice and 
that choice caused the action.”18 Given this scenario, people seem not all that interested in 
16 Robert Kane is the most well- known representative of free will premium view. See, e.g., Robert Kane, 
The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
17 Andrew Monroe and Bertram Malle, “Free Will without Metaphysics,” in Surrounding Free Will: 
Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, ed. Alfred Mele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 29.
18 Monroe and Malle, “Free Will,” 42.
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whether the alternative possibilities condition is filled or not. This result points away from 
the free will regular view, where alternative possibilities are taken as necessary conditions 
of free will.
Perhaps the free will light approach is the most intuitive position among the three 
outlined above. This would already be theologically relevant, maybe even striking. A 
number of theologians and philosophers assume that our everyday, folk view of free 
will takes choices and decisions to require indeterminacy either prior to the decision 
or at the point of the decision (free will regular or free will premium). Let me just take 
one example. Defending a Christian view of persons as Imago Dei, philosopher J. P. 
Moreland states
It is widely acknowledged that worldwide, the commonsense, spontaneously 
formed understanding of human free will is what philosophers call libertarian free-
dom: one acts freely only if one’s action was not determined— directly or indirect-
ly— by forces outside one’s control, and one must be free to act or refrain from 
acting; one’s choice is ‘spontaneous’, it originates with and only with the actor.19
Moreland goes on to argue that our everyday view is incompatible with naturalism, 
since naturalism cannot allow for spontaneous actions: our decisions and choices are just 
links in a continuous chain of causation. A theistic metaphysics is a better fit for our every-
day view of agency than a naturalist one, because it can account for agents standing out-
side continuous causal chains. Thus, Moreland assumes that some combination of agent 
causation and mind/body dualism is the default folk position. As we have seen, the ex-
perimental results suggest that it is not at all clear that our everyday view is as Moreland 
describes it. If it is the case that the commonsense view is not unambiguously ‘libertarian,’ 
as Moreland puts it, the central premise of his argument is unfounded. Perhaps it is an 
intuition among professional analytic philosophers that choices require indeterminacy, but 
it is by no means clear that non- philosophers think in this way.
Some philosophers have even suggested that “free will” is a philosophical construct 
because there is nothing more to the everyday notion than the rather normal psycholog-
ical processes of intending, deciding and acting. Philosophers use this notion to refer to 
a number of metaphysical, as opposed to everyday, problems and this double usage 
creates confusion. According to van Inwagen, for instance, free will in everyday par-
lance is simply about the voluntariness of a specific action. My doing something “out of 
my own free will” simply means that I did it voluntarily. As opposed to this, philoso-
phers and scientists tend to use free will as a title for various compatibility problems, 
like the incompatibility of determinism and choice, for instance.20 These problems 
might easily lack an intuitive sitz im leben, or so the argument goes. This conclusion 
would be supported by the results Monroe and Malle have reviewed: our everyday 
notion of free will refers to voluntariness of actions in different contexts.
The interpretation of the results of Monroe and Malle might be more complicated than 
it would initially appear. First, there is some evidence suggesting that the principle of 
alternative possibilities matters under certain conditions. Sometimes people do indeed 
assume that the ability to do otherwise is required for moral responsibility. If correct, this 
would challenge the simple conclusion that the free will light view is more intuitive than 
19 J. P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (London: SCM 
Press, 2009), 41.
20 Peter van Inwagen, Thinking about Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 192- 96.
How the Cognitive Sciences Might Contribute to the Theological Debate about Free Will 369
© 2021 The Authors. Modern Theology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
the free will regular position. As this issue is related to the question of compatibility, I 
will return to it later in more detail. Second, there is some evidence suggesting that 
mind/body dualism of some kind or another is rather intuitive for humans. According 
to some studies, it is easy for humans to separate the subject of mental states (the person) 
from the subject of biological and physical states, which would lend some support to the 
idea of the self or the soul being separate from the body.21 While Monroe and Malle did 
not find a correlation between belief in free will and belief in souls, there might, never-
theless, be some kind of intuitive link between dualism and free will. This might have to 
do with the status of the subject of intentions and beliefs, the self, but further experimen-
tal research is needed here.
Reason and Will
These experimental findings are relevant for theology in yet another way, regarding the 
debate between intellectualist and voluntarist views of the will. Historically, theologi-
ans have disagreed as to how reason and will are related.22 This arose as a central theme 
in medieval philosophy in the debates between Thomists and Scotists, for example. 
Very roughly, the intellectualist thinks that reason provides evaluations of the extent to 
which some goal or desire is in accordance with the good. The will subsequently moves 
the person to action according to the evaluation of reason. Only to the extent that human 
reason is able to identify the good, the proper end goal of desires and intentions, does 
the will act accordingly.23 Against this, the voluntarist maintains that the will can also 
initiate spontaneous actions that are somewhat independent from the outcomes of rea-
son’s evaluations. Free actions are not necessitated by prior evaluations and reasons, 
but the will retains the ability spontaneously to make up its mind. Given contemporary 
terminology, this would count as a strong version of the alternative possibilities condi-
tion, free will regular at least.
If Monroe and Malle’s overview of the current research is correct, many of our every-
day intuitions are on the intellectualist side, favoring more Thomist accounts of free-
dom rather than voluntarist ones. Choices and decisions humans make have their roots 
in their intentions and goals, which are, in the stereotypical case, products of reason. In 
order to explain human actions, there is no need to refer to a power of the will to gener-
ate spontaneous actions and decisions. The results of cognitive psychology of human 
decision- making and action generation point to another conclusion relevant for the 
theological debate about will and reason. While there are good reasons to reject the 
skeptical conclusion of Wegner and others, this still leaves us with a massive amount 
evidence regarding the pervasive nature of automaticity in human cognition and the 
limitations of conscious control of actions. All this casts doubt on our capacities for gen-
erating actions in the way that free will premium requires. Having ultimate source-
hood, for instance, seems to require that an agent have deep and full control over her 
21 Matthias Forstmann and Pascal Burgmer, “Adults Are Intuitive Mind- body Dualists,” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General 144, no.1 (2015): 222– 35.
22 Toivo Holopainen, “Will and Choice in Medieval Thought,” in The Sourcebook for History of the Philosophy 
of Mind: Philosophical Psychology from Plato to Kant, eds. Simo Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2014), 549- 50.
23 For a defense of the rationalist view, see e.g., Jesse Couenhoven, Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ: Agency, 
Necessity, and Culpability in Augustinian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Couenhoven calls 
this view “normative freedom.”
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own moral character. But this kind of control, especially in moral matters, is very frag-
mented and provisory at best, as far as the current research is concerned.24
Recently, Jesse Couenhoven has drawn out the implications of this claim for theology. 
Couenhoven argues that human lives are subject to various forms of luck and contin-
gency that are independent of our own agency. Our moral decisions are very sensitive 
to environmental conditions and specific social contexts, as contemporary psychology 
so aptly demonstrates. He writes:
The difficulty for the libertarian is that the beliefs and cares that motivate our 
choices do not themselves generally appear to be products of significant choices. 
Even important decisions . . . are deeply shaped by environmental cues and social 
currents that we have not chosen and that we often fail to comprehend. Our deci-
sions about these topics find their source in conceptions of self and good life over 
which we have, at best, limited volitional control. How then can we achieve inde-
pendent self- determination?25
It seems that the sources of an agent’s actions are seldom in the control of the agent. 
Rather, the agent’s tendencies and abilities depend mainly on upbringing, parents, their 
genes, the surrounding environment and involuntary psychological tendencies. That is 
not to say that there is no control over action. Rather, it is to point out that this control is 
made possible by factors that are, for the most part, not under the conscious control of the 
agent. Couenhoven calls this the scarcity problem: even if humans were capable of occa-
sionally acting in such a way as to satisfy the conditions of the free will premium view, 
most human decisions and choices do not fulfill such conditions. In other words, spon-
taneous choices contributing to one’s character and overall goals are really rare. If one is 
preliminarily committed to free will and moral responsibility, this fact is a reason to reject 
the free will regular view but especially the free will premium position.
Why Free Will Matters
It is unfortunate that theologians seldom explicitly address the issue of the significance 
of free will. In recent philosophical discussions on free will skepticism, however, the 
topic has been the focus of a lot of attention. Looking at the significance of free will can 
help us to understand what is at stake in the debate.26
As I already mentioned, many philosophers see an intimate connection between 
moral responsibility and free will— so much so that free will is often defined as the con-
trol condition for moral responsibility. So, this is the first reason why free will matters: 
it is difficult to see how anyone could be held morally responsible if there were no free 
will. Free will is also implicated in many theories of moral development and moral vir-
tue. A virtue- based account of moral life looks meaningful insofar as a person can have 
some measure of conscious control over her character. Furthermore, free will seems to 
be crucial for highly- valued human relationships. Loving someone seems to require a 
conscious commitment to certain kinds of attitudes and actions towards the one who is 
loved. Similarly, complex human moral relational attitudes, like shame and repentance, 
24 For various examples of such phenomena in the case of moral cognition, see e.g., Christian Miller, The 
Character Gap: How Good Are We? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
25 Jesse Couenhoven, Predestination: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2018), 152.
26 One central contribution to the discussion is Kane, The Significance of Free Will.
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look groundless without free will. Finally, it is difficult to imagine what guilt and for-
giveness might look like if no action whatsoever were really up to us. How could I 
blame myself for a morally wrong action if that action were not really up to me?27 All of 
this is theologically significant. Theologians almost universally assume human moral 
responsibility and the possibility of moral development. Christian life clearly involves 
deep attitudes and emotions connected to relationships with others. It seems impossi-
ble even to imagine an account of Christian spiritual and moral life without the notions 
of love, repentance, guilt and forgiveness. Yet, these attitudes are, arguably, dependent 
on there being some kind of free will.
It should also be added that for many theologians and philosophers, free will is cru-
cial for the project of theodicy. Indeed, current interest in free will in philosophy of reli-
gion can be traced to Alvin Plantinga’s free will defence and the subsequent discussion. 
Some have even suggested that the contemporary shift towards libertarian accounts of 
free will (as opposed to the more historically prevalent compatibilist accounts) is pre-
cisely because of the debate about theodicy.28 This link between free will and theodicy 
might have significant effects on the debate in the philosophy of religion. If libertarian 
accounts of free will are increasingly challenged, this might introduce further pressure 
towards theologians and philosophers to turn towards theodicies that do not rely either 
on free will regular or free will premium positions.
Regarding the psychological significance of free will, recent studies have found inter-
esting connections between belief in free will and how people regulate their moral life. 
More specifically, studies suggest that belief in free will contributes to a wide range of 
pro- social behavioral tendencies. In a recent survey of experiments, social psychologist 
Roy Baumeister and others present the following findings.29 First, studies point to a 
connection between self- control and belief in free will. When the participants were 
primed with material undercutting free will, they tended to exhibit increased aggres-
siveness, conformist tendencies, willingness to punish outsiders and refraining from 
helping and cooperating with others. One of the first studies on this front was that of 
Kathleen Vohs and Jonathan Schooler more than a decade ago. What they noticed was 
that when participants were primed with material undermining free will, they tended 
to cheat more and present their actions in a more favorable light.30 Baumeister and oth-
ers take these results as confirming that
. . . belief in free will motivates people to think and act autonomously, and so they 
put in their mental effort to consider alternative courses of action that could have 
brought different consequences. Conversely, disbelief in free will may offer an ap-
pealing excuse for people to be lazy and not bother to consider alternative actions 
and outcomes.31
27 This is not to say that moral responsibility and important relational attitudes would have to be com-
pletely abandoned if there were no free will. See e.g., Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and the Meaning of Life 
(New Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014).
28 Daniel Speak and Kevin Timpe, “Introduction,” in Free Will & Theism, eds. Kevin Timpe and Daniel 
Speak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 4- 7.
29 Roy Baumeister, Cory Clark, and Jamie Luguri, “Free Will: Belief and Reality,” in Surrounding Free Will: 
Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, ed. Alfred Mele (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), 61- 64.
30 Kathleen Voss and Jonathan Schooler, “The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in 
Determinism Increases Cheating,” Psychological Science 19 (2008): 49- 54.
31 Baumeister et. al. “Free Will: Belief and Reality,” 62.
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Surprisingly, moral self- regulation was not the only behavioral effect of undermining 
people’s belief in free will. Studies have also revealed a connection between belief in free 
will and experiencing life as meaningful and fulfilling. People who find their life meaning-
ful tend to believe in free will. Conversely, when people’s belief in free will is undermined, 
they tend to report that their lives are less meaningful. Studies also found that undercut-
ting people’s belief in free will had an effect on their willingness to set long- time goals and 
act in pursuit of them.32 These effects are probably because experiencing one’s life as mean-
ingful requires a sense of control over one’s life and life projects. Insofar as my life is not up 
to me and I cannot direct it by setting long- term goals, the life is no longer mine. So, it 
makes sense to see it as less meaningful.
One conclusion that could be drawn from this research is that one’s belief in one’s 
possibilities of making a difference is crucial for one’s moral motivations. In other 
words, the stronger the belief in an individual’s own agency and the possibility to 
change things, the more pro- social the individual will be and the more meaningful she 
will take her life to be. This conclusion should give theologians significant pause. In an 
especially precarious position are those who deny free will exists altogether, and those 
who maintain that our moral and spiritual life is not up to us. Whenever we say that 
something is not really up to us, we are simultaneously undermining motivational rea-
sons for that action. If a theologian says, for instance, that faith in God is not really up 
to us, this will intuitively undercut the motivation to strive towards strengthening or 
trying to obtain faith. Similarly, if we hold that everything that happens is, ultimately, 
up to God, this, again intuitively, undermines moral motivations to do better, since it is 
not ultimately up to us anyway. These inferences might certainly be false and the theo-
logical case for the compatibility of determinism, providence and free will might be 
very strong. Regardless, accepting an abstract theological argument does very little to 
change people’s intuitive responses. It might turn out that people reflectively adapt 
“theologically correct” views based on theological teaching but intuitively respond dif-
ferently. In other words, belief in divine determinism and thoroughgoing providence 
might be very difficult for people to live by.33
The experimental results are particularly problematic for those theological views that 
deny free will. Famously, Martin Luther argued against human free will in his De Servo 
Arbitrio. Luther takes free will to require the ability to do otherwise such that it is incom-
patible with any kind of prior necessity. In our terminology, he affirms free will regular 
and premium conditions. The problem, however, is that humans do not actually meet 
these conditions. Humans are unable to do otherwise (free will regular), because every-
thing is made necessary by God’s omniscience. Because God knows the future infallibly, 
everything happens necessarily.34 Further, humans lack significant control over “the 
direction of their will,” i.e., what they want. Instead, either God or the Devil ultimately 
controls their will.35 Luther concludes that humans have no free will; only God is able 
to fulfill the conditions of free will. In our terminology, this means that while humans 
have the ability to act freely on the basis of their intentions and goals (free will light), 
32 Ibid., 64.
33 There is evidence that many different kinds of theological correctness does affect religious thinking. See 
D. Jason Slone, Theological Incorrectness: Why Religious People Believe What They Shouldn’t (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
34 Ernst Winter, trans. and ed., Desiderius Erasmus and Martin Luther: Discourse on Free Will (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015), 112.
35 Ibid., 115- 16.
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they have no control over their ultimate character and desires. Thus, humans cannot 
carry ultimate responsibility (free will premium).
Luther’s famous volume is a response to Erasmus of Rotterdam, who had earlier 
criticized Luther’s views. One of Erasmus’ arguments is a political one: people should 
believe in free will because otherwise they would not bother to strive to act morally. 
Belief in free will serves an important social and moral function, and Erasmus is wor-
ried that Luther’s vehement criticisms of free will might lead to unwanted moral and 
political consequences.36 Furthermore, Erasmus also argues that if there were no free 
will at all with respect to, say, human moral actions and faith in God (that is, these ac-
tions were not up to us in any sense), it would be difficult to see how God could hold us 
morally accountable for sinful and evil actions, on the one hand, or praise the saints for 
their goodness, on the other. If I cannot in any way contribute to the moral nature of my 
actions, then holding me responsible (blaming or praising) for my moral actions is un-
just.37 Against this, Luther maintains that humans are morally responsible even though 
they lack free will. God is in His rights to hold humans responsible for their sinful ac-
tions while humans could not have avoided these actions, nor could they have shaped 
their characters in a better direction.
Given the empirical evidence presented above, Luther’s views are more counterintu-
itive than Erasmus’. As Baumeister points out, belief in free will significantly contrib-
utes to overall moral and social behavior. Given these findings, Erasmus is right to 
worry about the moral and societal effects of Luther’s teaching. Preaching against free 
will might have significant negative moral consequences. Moreover, Erasmus is more in 
line with intuitive human reasoning when he maintains that we cannot be reasonably 
held morally responsible for actions and omissions that are not up to us in any sense. 
Baumeister and others have provided a number of experimental results that point to a 
close connection between belief in free will and the tendency to adopt attitudes of moral 
responsibility.38 If belief in free will is systematically undermined, there might be signif-
icant drop in our tendency to hold each other responsible.
Theological Compatibility Problems
Another issue that arises from these social scientific findings is the compatibility 
question, namely, the relationship between divine determinism and human free will. 
Traditionally, philosophers and theologians have identified and addressed a number 
of theologically- motivated compatibility problems, not just one. In order to propose 
solutions to these problems, one must decide what conditions free actions should ful-
fill, that is, which one of the positions above is correct (free will light, regular or pre-
mium). The truth of divine determinism could rule out some conditions but not others. 
Understandably, divine determinists, like Luther, have gravitated towards free will 
light rather than regular or premium, since divine determinism is easier to reconcile 
with views of agency that do not require alternative possibilities or deep control over 
one’s moral character.
By divine determinism, I refer to a variety of views according to which God’s will, 
knowledge or actions are such that they necessitate (or determine) all created facts, 
36 Ibid., 16- 17.
37 Ibid., 87.
38 Baumeister et. al. “Free Will: Belief and Reality,” 64- 66.
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including free actions of creatures.39 By compatibility problems, I am referring to situa-
tions where the belief in human free will is seemingly incompatible with some other, 
purportedly crucial theological commitment which involves God’s determining or ne-
cessitating a specific outcome. Let me just mention three such problems.
The first is the classical problem of God’s foreknowledge and human free will. If 
God’s knowledge of the future includes future human actions and God cannot under 
any circumstances be wrong, then it seems that humans are not free in terms of their 
future actions. God’s knowing my future action seems to make it inevitable somehow.40 
As I already mentioned above, Luther used God’s foreknowledge to argue for divine 
determinism. Another compatibility problem is that of grace and free will. If God’s giv-
ing of grace to me is not up to me in any sense, then I have no control over whether I am 
saved or not. However, if God’s giving of grace to me is not up to me in any sense, then 
it seems unjustified to hold me morally responsible for acting sinfully, since I could not 
have acted otherwise. This problem seems to undermine God’s righteousness in pun-
ishing people for something that was not up to them in the first place.41 Finally, the third 
problem is also extensively discussed in contemporary literature. This has to do with 
God’s providence and universal causality. Many early Christian and medieval theolo-
gians affirmed God’s universal causality according to which all created events are ulti-
mately caused by God. To be sure, created substances have the power of secondary 
causality, but nothing in creation is separated from God’s primary causality. When this 
view of divine causality is combined with a thoroughgoing account of providence, a 
powerful compatibility problem arises. It is difficult to see how human actions can be 
free in any meaningful sense if they are part of God’s necessary plan and thus caused 
by God.42
One possible explanation for the prevalence of these problems in theological reflec-
tion is that there is something cognitively intuitive about them. In other words, the 
compatibility of free will and divine determinism might be counterintuitive. But what 
exactly is counterintuitive about this relation? Traditionally, philosophers have main-
tained that the incompatibility is based on the alternative possibilities condition. Divine 
determinism— or any kind of determinism, for that matter— is a threat to free will be-
cause it makes our choices necessary, thus removing access to alternative possibilities. 
Recently, however, more attention has been directed towards the issue of sourcehood. 
What matters in free choice might not be the ability to do otherwise but the agent’s 
ability to be the source of her actions, that is, to have control over the psychological 
conditions (character, intentions) that give rise to her actions. If determinism were true, 
the sources of the agent’s actions would not be in the agent herself but independent of 
the agent and outside the agent’s control. We should highlight this distinction between 
leeway conditions of free will (alternative possibilities) and sourcehood conditions.43 
39 There are many issues regarding the definition of divine determinism. For the details, see e.g., Peter 
Furlong, The Challenges of Divine Determinism: A Philosophical Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2019).
40 One discussion of this complicated issue is Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
41 Kevin Timpe provides a sophisticated discussion on this and offers a solution in his Free Will in 
Philosophical Theology (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).
42 One recent treatment of this problem is W. Matthews Grant, Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The 
Dual Sources Account (London: Bloomsbury, 2019).
43 Kevin Timpe, “Leeway vs. Sourcehood Conceptions of Free Will,” in The Routledge Companion to Free 
Will, eds. Kevin Timpe, Megan Griffith, and Neil Levy (London: Routledge, 2017), 213- 24.
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So, there are two ways for the compatibility problem to arise: either determinism takes 
away our leeway freedom by removing alternative possibilities, or it takes away our 
sourcehood by removing our control over the sources of our actions.
Diverging Intuitions about Compatibility
There is a complex theological debate revolving around various compatibility prob-
lems. On the one hand, theological incompatibilists reject divine determinism because 
it is in tension with what they believe to be correct conditions for free will (regular or 
premium). Against this, theological compatibilists maintain that free will is compatible 
with divine determinism because God’s necessitating or determining human psycho-
logical events does rule without overriding our free will.44 These disagreements emerge 
often in the debate about the nature of God’s providence. Many Calvinists, for instance, 
hold that God’s providence is comprehensive, namely, that every fact, including free 
human actions, is fixed by God’s unchanging will. They then proceed to defend a free 
will light position as the correct condition for free will which allows them to hold on to 
human moral responsibility.45 Against this, critics maintain that in order for humans to 
be responsible, free will regular is required. Since free will regular is incompatible with 
comprehensive divine providence, God’s providence must be such that there is leeway 
for creaturely choices.46 Let us now see what the cognitive sciences have to contribute 
to the debate.
One crucial contribution has already been mentioned. Contrary to what some 
theologically- motivated incompatibilists think, it is not at all clear that our everyday 
notion of free will requires alternative possibilities or ultimate sourcehood. These re-
sults are good news for theological compatibilists. However, the situation might be 
more complicated than this. There is an extensive experimental literature on the com-
patibility problem and the overall picture remains messy. There might be tendencies 
that make incompatibilism surprisingly intuitive after all, especially in the case of di-
vine determinism.
Summarizing a series of experiments, philosopher Eddy Nahmias suggests that our 
intuitions are mostly on the compatibilist side. In these experiments, participants were 
presented with different kinds of deterministic scenarios involving, for example, genes 
or supercomputers determining human behavior. The participants were then asked to 
make responsibility judgments of actions performed by people who inhabited such 
worlds. The answers tended to point towards intuitive compatibilism: if internal psy-
chological states of the actors in the stories were involved (they intended to perform the 
actions they did and were not coerced), the actors were taken to be responsible for their 
actions even in deterministic worlds. However, when directly confronted with compat-
ibility cases, the participants tended to think that determinism and free will are mutu-
ally exclusive. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that belief in the incompatibility 
of free will and determinism described abstractly is rather universal.47
44 For contributions from both sides, see e.g., Timpe and Speak, Free Will & Theism.
45 See e.g., Paul Helm, “God Does Not Take Risks” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, eds. M. 
L. Peterson and R. J. VanArragon (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 228- 37.
46 See e.g., Bruce Reichenbach, Divine Providence: God’s Love and Human Freedom (Eugene, OR: Cascade 
Books, 2016).
47 Eddy Nahmias, “Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing” in Robert Kane, ed., The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 555- 76.
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Interestingly, Nahmias suggested that this intuitive incompatibilism about choice 
might be based on an implicit inference that is false. Through a series of ingenious ex-
periments, Nahmias has attempted to show that what is going on in these cases is what 
he calls “bypassing.” The bypassing inference is a false assumption that if determinism 
were true, our normal decision- making mechanisms and volitions would be “by-
passed,” that is, they would not be involved in generating actions.48 So, people do not 
reason like this: “if determinism were true, I would have no choice, so I would not have 
free will.” Instead, they reason like this: “if determinism were true, my intentions, be-
liefs and decisions would have no bearing on my actions, and therefore I would not 
have free will.” However, as Nahmias points out, even if the former inference were true, 
the latter most certainly is not. The truth of determinism is compatible with the fact that 
the agent’s intentions, beliefs and decisions are part of the causal mix.
Studies also suggest that there is significant context- sensitivity in compatibility intu-
itions. When presented with abstract, morally neutral scenarios with low emotional 
content, the participants tend to be incompatibilist, that is, they tend to infer that deter-
minism rules out moral responsibility. However, when presented with more concrete, 
morally and emotionally loaded scenarios, people see no conflict. The more concrete the 
scenario, the less determinism matters and ordinary psychological notions of choice 
and intention take over.49
Shaun Nichols proposes a possible explanation for why people have conflicting intu-
itions about the compatibility of free will and determinism. He suggests that compati-
bility problems are created by a clash of two distinct cognitive systems. On the one 
hand, humans have a set of cognitive mechanisms geared for producing explanations 
across multiple domains. Folk physics and folk biology produce explanations of the 
movements of physical objects and the behaviors of animate entities. Folk psychology 
is a distinct set of systems designed to deal with agents and, among other things, pro-
vide intentional explanations of agents’ actions. All these systems operate on the as-
sumption that there are explanations to be had in all these domains. The deliverances of 
folk psychology, for instance, support the belief that all human actions, as well as choices 
and decisions, do indeed have explanations. This makes it intuitively plausible that in-
dividual choices always have some explanation in terms of prior factors (intentions, 
reasons, beliefs). On the other hand, there is our conscious source experience that seems 
to suggest that even when there are overwhelming reasons on one side, we have the 
ability to choose otherwise.50 John Searle directs our attention to the gap, which exists 
between our reasons for action and the action itself. In order to describe human actions, 
we cannot describe them as a sequence of events only. There is a rational self that oper-
ates in the gap between reasons of action and the action itself. This is how we experi-
ence our own actions, according to Searle.51 If this is correct, our experience of our own 
decision- making seems to draw us in the incompatibilist direction, whereas the “ex-
planatory compulsion” of our cognitive system tends toward the compatibilist 
direction.
48 Ibid., 561- 68. Not everyone has agreed with Nahmias’ interpretation of his results. For a critical take on 
bypassing, see Gunnar Björnsson, “Incompatibilism and ‘Bypassed’ Agency” in Surrounding Free Will: 
Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, ed. Alfred Mele (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), 95- 122.
49 Shaun Nichols, Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
77- 82.
50 Ibid., 17- 32.
51 John Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 50- 58.
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Nichols goes on to suggest that our experience of making underdetermined choices 
might not be a reliable source of how we actually make choices, so we should not 
ground our incompatibilism on this experience, as Searle does. Nichols writes:
For we know that introspection misses out on causally important influences. Thus, 
even if there are deterministic factors that cause our decisions, we cannot expect 
introspection to tell us. So the fact that we don’t introspect a set of deterministic 
factors doesn’t provide grounds for believing that there are not deterministic 
factors.52
As I have already suggested, one of the central results of cognitive psychology of 
human decision- making is that there are various causes involved in these processes that 
are, for the most part, opaque to our consciousness. This undermines the evidential force 
of the first- person source experience: even if it seems to me that my decisions are underde-
termined by prior causes, I cannot justifiably believe this simply on the basis of my experi-
ence, because introspection alone does not have access to all possible causes.
These discussions raise interesting and challenging problems for theologians. 
Theological incompatibilists should avoid grounding their incompatibilism on intro-
spection, experience and intuitive incompatibilism. As far as we know, our intuitions 
about the incompatibility of choice and determinism might be based on a false inference 
about “bypassing” and our experience of underdetermined choices might be mistaken. 
This is, again, good news for the theological compatibilist and defender of God’s com-
prehensive providence. If incompatibilist intuitions have a dubious source in a mis-
taken inference or unreliable introspection, their evidential value is clearly diminished. 
However, even if their evidential value for the case for theological incompatibilism 
were minimal, the intuitions would not go away. Because of our experience of making 
undetermined choices, the picture of the future as a garden of forking paths is very 
difficult to set aside. If the determinist is correct and people indeed could make choices 
and be morally responsible under divine determinism, he would still have to give up 
the garden of forking paths picture. This, in turn, might make the comprehensive view 
of providence difficult to grasp intuitively. Whatever happens will end up looking like 
fate or destiny.
Manipulation Difficulties for Divine Determinists
What I have suggested so far is that studies point towards conclusions more favorable 
to theological compatibilists than to their incompatibilist rivals. The most crucial re-
sult here is that our intuitions regarding the incompatibility of choice and determinism 
might be wrong. At this point, the incompatibilist could object by pointing out that the 
studies that Nichols and Nahmias have conducted and cited are about the compatibility 
of causal or physical determinism and free will, not about divine determinism at all. So, 
the question is whether there is an intuitive difference between divine determinism and 
causal determinism. Many theologians, especially in the Calvinist and divine determin-
ist camp, have wanted to draw such a distinction. Theologian Hans Madueme, for in-
stance, argues that while free will is incompatible with causal or physical determinism, 
52 Nichols, Bound, 52.
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it is compatible with divine determinism. Causal and physical determinism entails that 
humans are simply parts of a causal chain that has its roots in events outside their con-
trol. This is not true of divine determinism:
. . . theological determinism (i.e. divine causal determinism) as I define it does not 
entail physical causal determinism. When God decrees sin, his sovereign rule does 
not operate as one among many other “intramundane” causes (creaturely causes 
that exist within the nexus of our world). Divine ordination operates on a different 
level from creaturely, intramundane causation.53
Divine determinism is different from physical determinism because its operative prin-
ciples are not just causes among other causes in the created world. Instead, God is related 
to creation like an author to a story, orchestrating it from the outside. God’s action in ne-
cessitating and causing created events differs so much from causation in the created world 
that it poses no threat to free will.
Philosophically, this issue is rather complicated and I cannot treat it in any detail 
here. However, I will suggest that while distinguishing divine determinism from causal 
determinism might be philosophically warranted, it comes with a high counterintuitive 
cost in practice. There is some experimental evidence suggesting that, given everyday 
reasoning, it might be more difficult (rather than less difficult) to reconcile divine deter-
minism with free will than with other forms of determinism. This is because divine de-
terminism involves an agent, God, that is the source of relevant necessities. The fact that 
another agent is involved in and orchestrating the situation triggers a strong intuition 
that humans are not ultimately responsible after all— an intuition that is not triggered 
in the case of causal determinism. Divine determinism makes God intuitively look like 
a puppet master or a manipulator.
In the philosophical context, these worries have emerged in the debate about manipu-
lation arguments for incompatibilism. Manipulation arguments come in many types but 
they share a common structure. First, they seek to produce the intuition that when an 
agent is massively manipulated by someone to perform a certain action, the agent is not 
morally responsible for that action. This is, plausibly, because that agent is no longer the 
source of her action in this case; it is rather the manipulator who is responsible for it. 
Second, the arguments attempt to show that the same feature that makes us think that 
the agent is not responsible in the manipulation case is also present in the case of deter-
minism being true. In other words, if free will is incompatible with manipulation, it is 
incompatible with determinism as well because determinism entails manipulation.54
Consider Alfred Mele’s manipulation story that directly appeals to the manipulation 
intuition. It involves an omnipotent and omniscient goddess Diana and Ernie (a human 
person Diana wants to perform an action at a certain time).
Diana creates a zygote Z in Mary. She combines Z’s atoms as she does because she 
wants a certain event E to occur thirty years later. From her knowledge of the state 
of the universe just prior to her creating Z and the laws of nature of her determin-
istic universe, she deduces that a zygote with precisely Z’s constitution located in 
53 Hans Madueme, “From Sin to the Soul: A Dogmatic Argument for Dualism”, in The Christian Doctrine of 
Humanity, eds. Oliver Crisp and Fred Sanders (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2018), 86.
54 For an overview, see Kristin Mickelson, “The Manipulation Argument” in The Routledge Companion to 
Free Will, eds. Kevin Timpe, Megan Griffith, and Neil Levy (London: Routledge, 2017), 166- 78.
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Mary will develop into an ideally self- controlled agent who, in thirty years, will 
judge, on the basis of rational deliberation, that it is best to A and will A on the basis 
of that judgment, thereby bringing about E. [. . .] Thirty years later, Ernie is a men-
tally healthy, ideally self- controlled person who regularly exercises his powers of 
self- control and has no relevant compelled or coercively produced attitudes. 
Furthermore, his beliefs are conducive to informed deliberation about all matters 
that concern him, and he is a reliable deliberator.55
Then Ernie goes on to perform E.
In my own case, I have to admit that the intuition of excusing Ernie from the re-
sponsibility for bringing about E is pretty strong. I find it rather appealing to conclude 
that Ernie cannot be held responsible for E, because Ernie’s A- ing had its roots outside 
Ernie, in the deliberate plans of Diana. The problem is not that Diana takes away Ernie’s 
choice, it is rather that Ernie does not seem to be the source of his actions.
The Calvinist philosopher Guillaume Bignon has argued that such cases do not con-
stitute a problem for Christians, however, since the Christian God is not like Diana. God 
does not meddle in zygotes and engage in any kind of manipulation or coercion.56 But 
I am not sure this will solve the problem. It is true that the temporal distance between 
God’s actions is greater than in the case of Diana. It might also be true that God might 
not micromanage zygotes to achieve his goals. Nevertheless, God does, if divine deter-
minism is true, create a world where he intends events like E to happen via Ernie. God’s 
decreeing or willing Ernie’s action takes place “in the beginning of the world,” so to 
speak, at the moment of creation. God’s mechanism of making Ernie to A to make E 
necessary would be different from that of Diana but the sourcehood issue still stands: 
Ernie’s bringing about E has its sources in God, not in Ernie, and so it seems plausible 
to excuse Ernie from responsibility for E.
Manipulation arguments for incompatibilism are very relevant for theologians, since 
they offer an intuitively plausible way to undermine the compatibility of divine deter-
minism and free will.57 In his discussion of manipulation arguments, Peter Furlong 
admits that there might be a significant intuitive cost in accepting divine determinism. 
This would be to give up on the intuition that massive manipulation removes responsi-
bility.58 The divine determinist might have to bite the bullet here and claim that people 
like Ernie are responsible for their actions, even while many people find it intuitively 
implausible.
Biting this bullet could be very demanding because there is evidence suggesting that 
our intuitions about agents manipulating other agents are rather deep- seated and 
strong. Recent studies have found that participants tend to mitigate responsibility in 
manipulation situations where other agents are present. Nichols describes the studies of 
Jonathan Phillips and Alex Shaw, who conducted a series of experiments to investigate 
how people respond to various vignettes describing situations of manipulation. They 
concluded that participants had a strong tendency to withhold blame when the manip-
ulation was done by an agent as opposed to situations where the manipulator was not 
55 Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 188.
56 Guillaume Bignon, Excusing Sinner and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral 
Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2018), 31- 32.
57 For discussion, see e.g., Furlong, The Challenges of Divine Determinism; Bignon, Excusing Sinner and 
Blaming God.
58 Furlong, The Challenges of Divine Determinism, 82.
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an agent at all but rather a set of circumstances.59 Nichols takes this to be good news for 
the causal determinist. If manipulation arguments lead us intuitively towards incom-
patibilism and this is because the manipulator is an agent, our intuitions might not be 
reliable in cases where there is no manipulator, namely, in the case of non- theistic causal 
determinism. Hence, the intuition that determinism involves manipulation is based on 
a faulty inference regarding agents. The road is now clear for naturalist compatibilists 
because they have no puppeteer in the picture. This way of debunking intuitive incom-
patibilism regarding manipulation is not available for the divine determinist, however, 
since she most certainly has a manipulating agent in the picture, God. The divine deter-
minist will have a hard time trying to convince people that they are responsible for sin 
and evil and that God is not. God will, intuitively, look very much like a puppeteer even 
if there were a good case for the compatibility of human moral responsibility and God’s 
overall providence.
Concluding Remarks
My basic argument in this essay is that the cognitive sciences are relevant for theologi-
cal debates. I began by reviewing cases where theological arguments invoke intuitions 
in support of their premises, but have questioned whether those intuitions might be 
unreliable or not so widely shared as previously thought. As I see it, this is the case for 
a number of intuitions invoked in support of both the free will premium and regular 
positions. I have also suggested that belief in free will serves important social and moral 
functions that are crucially important for theologians. This is why straightforward de-
nials of free will on theological grounds might result in a number of unwanted moral 
consequences. These points, I submit, contribute to multiple theological discourses on 
free will.
In addition, the scientific results reviewed above will shape the theological debate 
about divine determinism in terms of its dialectic. Oftentimes, the debate about divine 
providence, for instance, assumes that the incompatibilist position is the most intuitive 
and therefore the onus is on the determinist to show why her counterintuitive stance is 
true. The burden of proof, so to speak, rests on the determinist’s shoulders. However, 
the results above suggest that the determinist has more intuitions on her side than pre-
viously assumed. There might well be equal or even more intuitive support for compat-
ibilism than incompatibilism, certainly more than many philosophers of religion think.
Moreover, the findings from social scientific studies provide a reason to shift the locus 
of the debate. Traditionally, the alternative condition— leeway freedom— has been at 
the center of the debate. The question has been whether divine determinism is compat-
ible with human free choice. The centrality of the sourcehood intuition and the possible 
unreliability of our intuitions about choice demonstrate that this might not be the core 
problem after all. The issue of sourcehood— whether the agent’s mental states (beliefs, 
intentions, goals) are involved in the decision- making process— might be intuitively the 
most crucial. If this were the case, theologians should direct more attention to those ar-
guments that challenge sourcehood, like various manipulation arguments. The problem 
59 Nichols, Bound, 91- 92. Jonathan Phillips and Alex Shaw, “Manipulating Morality: Third- Party Intentions 
Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning,” Cognitive Science 39 (2015): 1320- 47. See also, Dylan 
Murray and Tania Lombrozo, “Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral 
Responsibility,” Cognitive Science 41 (2017): 447- 81.
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with comprehensive providence, therefore, might not be that it seems to remove choice 
but rather that it seems to bypass the person as a source of her actions.
I have also suggested that the results of cognitive psychology regarding human 
decision- making and choice offer support to those theological views that set the condi-
tions of free will and moral responsibility rather low along the lines of the free will light 
position. Even if we were capable of free will premium (being sources of our own char-
acter and tendencies) or free will regular (choices underdetermined by prior causes), 
these capabilities would not be instantiated that often. Instead, most of our actions have 
their roots in causes that are ultimately out of our control. Our accounts of free will 
should reflect this fact or risk losing free will and moral responsibility altogether.60 
These findings fit well into a determinist- friendly story of human moral agency. Indeed, 
they support those theological views of the human will that have been labeled as intel-
lectualist or Aristotelian rather than as voluntarist ones. However, I have also suggested 
that accepting intellectualist and compatibilist free will coupled with divine determin-
ism might have a surprisingly high intuitive cost: one might have to admit that our 
deep- seated intuitions about manipulation are wrong.
If our intuitive ways of thinking about free will as outlined in this essay are close to 
the truth, it could be that no single theological account of free will is capable of recon-
ciling or combining our various intuitions into a coherent whole. This would not be a 
surprise for a cognitive psychologist: our intuitions often turn out to be too context- 
sensitive and domain- specific to be easily systematized. Various thought experiments 
and other intuition pumps can be used to coax different responses out of participants. 
Consequently, whatever view we end up accepting on philosophical or theological 
grounds, there might be intuitions that have to be given up. Perhaps the reason free will 
is such a difficult topic for us is that every internally consistent theory leaves some rel-
evant intuitions out and is thus, at least to some extent, counterintuitive.61
60 For an interesting account of religious attitudes without free will, see Derk Pereboom, “Libertarianism 
and Theological Determinism,” in Timpe and Speak, Free Will & Theism, 112- 31.
61 I would like to thank the anonymous referees for comments and feedback. The research for the article 
was graciously funded by the Academy of Finland.
